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is work presents Information eoretic HotStu (IT-HS), a new optimally resilient protocol for solving Byzantine Agreement in
partial synchrony with information theoretic security guarantees. In particular, IT-HS does not depend on any PKI or common setup
assumptions and is resilient to computationally unbounded adversaries. IT-HS is based on the Primary-Backup view-based paradigm.
In IT-HS, in each view, and in each view change, each party sends only a constant number of words to every other party. is yields
an O (n2) word and message complexity in each view. In addition, IT-HS requires just O (1) persistent local storage and O (n) transient
local storage. Finally, like all Primary-Backup view-based protocols in partial synchrony, aer the system becomes synchronous,
all nonfaulty parties decide on a value in the rst view a nonfaulty leader is chosen. Moreover, like PBFT and HotStu, IT-HS is
optimistically responsive: with a nonfaulty leader, parties decide as quickly as the network allows them to do so, without regard for
the known upper bound on network delay. Our work improves in multiple dimensions upon the information theoretic version of
PBFT presented by Miguel Castro, and can be seen as an information theoretic variant of the HotStu paradigm.
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1 INTRODUCTION
is work assumes the model of Castro and Liskov’s PBFT protocol [7, 9, 11]. In particular we deal with the task of
Byzantine Agreement in a partially synchronous network. e seing of partial synchrony was proposed by Dwork et
al. [12] and studied extensively since. In this model, the network starts o as an asynchronous network and at some
unknown time becomes synchronous with a known delay ∆ on message arrival. is time is known as the Global
Stabilization Time, or GST in short. is model turns out to be a useful one, managing to capture some of the behaviour
of real-world networks. As in PBFT, our goal in this work is to reduce the use of cryptographic tools that require a
computationally bounded adversary as much as possible. Much like PBFT, our algorithm is information theoretically
secure. Formally, as in PBFT [7, 9, 11], our protocol is secure against adversaries that are not computationally bounded
under the assumption that there exist authenticated channels that can be made secure against such adversaries. For
example, authenticated channels can be obtained via a setup of one time pads or via antum key exchange [2].
ere are several good reasons to design protocols in the information theoretic security seing. First, from a
theoretical perspective we are interested in minimizing the assumptions. Fewer assumption oen tend to add clarity
and conceptual simplicity. Secondly, adding public-key cryptography primitives adds a performance overhead and
increases the code-base aack surface, whereas computations in the information-theoretic seing are quick and oen
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amount to simple memory management and counting. Finally, protocols in this seing are more “future-proof”. Such
protocol are more resilient to breaking certain cryptographic assumptions and to major technological disruptions in the
eld.
e PBFT variants that use a PKI and digital signatures can easily use bounded storage at each party (per active slot).
One of the challenges of the PBFT protocol when only authenticated channels (no signatures) are used is that obtaining
bounded storage is not immediate. Indeed all the peer reviewed papers that we are aware of obtain unbounded solutions
[7, 10]. Castro’s thesis [9] does include a bounded storage solution - but to the best of our knowledge this result was
not published in a peer reviewed venue.
1.1 Our Contribution
Our main contribution in this paper is Information eoretic HotStu (IT-HS), a protocol solving the task of Byzantine
Agreement in partial synchrony with information theoretic security using bounded storage that sends messages whose
maximal size is O(1) words (both during a view and during a view change). e protocol is resilient to any number of
Byzantine parties f such that n > 3f , making it optimally resilient. In the protocol, there are several virtual rounds
called views, and each one has a leader, called a primary. is is a common paradigm for solving Byzantine agreement,
famously used in the Paxos protocol [16] and in later iterations on those ideas such as PBFT [7, 9, 15] and more recent
protocols in the Blockchain era [4–6, 14, 18]. We use a standard measure of storage called a word and assume a word
can contain enough information to store any command, identier, or counter. Formally, this means that much like in all
previous systems and protocols, our counters, identiers, and views are bounded (by say 256 bits). In IT-HS, in each
view and in each view change, each party sends just a constant number of words and messages to each other party,
making the total word and message complexity O(n2) in each view and in each view change. As far as we know, this
is the best known communication complexity and word complexity for information theoretic protocols of this kind
(see table below for comparison). In addition, all parties require O(n) space throughout the protocol, out of which only
O(1) space needs to be persistent, crash-resistant memory. Clearly at least O(1) persistent memory is required, because
otherwise a decided upon value can be “forgoen” by all parties if they crash and reboot. As far as we know, O(n)
transient space complexity is the best known result. In the shared memory model, a lower bound of Ω(n) registers
exists [13], suggesting that the total amount of persistent memory in the system is optimal.
In IT-HS, all nonfaulty parties are guaranteed to decide on a value and terminate no later than the rst view a
nonfaulty party is chosen as primary aer GST. is is the asymptotically optimal convergence for such protocols: For
deterministic leader rotation this implies O(f ) rounds aer GST. If we assume that parties have access to a randomized
leader-election beacon, then this implies O(1) expected rounds aer GST. Furthermore, like PBFT and HotStu, IT-HS is
optimistically responsive. If the network delay is actually δ = o (∆), all nonfaulty parties terminate in O (δ ) time instead
of in O (∆) time. IT-HS uses an asymptotically optimal (constant) number of rounds given a non-faulty primary and
aer the network becomes synchronous.
e most relevant related works for IT-HS are the PBFT protocol variants [7, 9–11] and the HotStu protocol variants
[18]. e following table provides a comparison between them.
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Assumptions Persistent storage
Maximum size of
message (in words)
PBFT (OSDI) [11] PKI Ω(n) O(n)
PBFT (TOCS) [10]
Authenticated Channels,
Cryptographic Hash
Ω(n) per view
(unbounded)
Ω(n) per view
(unbounded)
PBFT (esis) [9]
Authenticated Channels,
Cryptographic Hash
O(1) O(n)
YAVP (Cachin) [7]
Authenticated Channels,
Cryptographic Hash
Ω(n) per view
(unbounded)
Ω(n) per view
(unbounded)
HotStu
(authenticators) [18]
PKI O(n) O(n)
HotStu
(threshold sig) [18]
DKG: reshold
signature setup
O(1) O(1)
(threshold sig)
IT-HS (this work) Authenticated Channels O(1) O(1)
As mentioned earlier, all previous peer-reviewed works in the information theoretic seing require at least Ω(n · v)
words of storage, where v is the view number. Since the view number can grow arbitrarily large, the persistent storage
requirement is unbounded.
We note that IT-HS does not only use fewer assumptions (does not use any cryptographic hash function), it also
obtains the asymptotically optimal O(1) word bound on the maximal message size. All other protocols require at least
Ω(n) size messages to be sent during view change by the primary (except for Hotstu when using a Distributed Key
Generation setup and threshold signatures).
Relative to PBFT, our work can be seen as addressing the open problem le in the PBFT journal version (which
uses unbounded space) and is an improvement of the non peer-reviewed PBFT thesis work - it obtains the same O(1)
persistent space while reducing the maximum message size from O(n) (in the PBFT view change) to the asymptotically
optimal O(1) maximum message size (and doing this even without using cryptographic hash functions).
Relative to HotStu, our work shows that without any PKI (public key infrastructure) or DKG (distributed key
generation) assumptions and without any cryptographic setup ceremony, constant size messages and constant size
persistent storage are possible! We do note that IT-HS requires O(n2) messages and words per view, while the Hostu
version with a DKG setup that uses threshold signatures requires just O(n) messages and words per view. On the
other hand, HS-IT requires no cryptographic setup ceremony and no computational assumptions other than pairwise
authenticated channels. Like HS-IT, all other protocols that do not use threshold signatures (even those that require a
PKI) use Ω(n2) words per view.
1.2 Main Techniques
As the name might suggest, IT-HS uses techniques similar to those used in the Tendermint, Caper, and HotStu
protocols [4–6, 18]. e main technique used is a lock and key mechanism which was suggested in HotStu [18] and
made explicit in [1]. In a basic locking mechanism [4, 12], before nonfaulty parties decide on a value, they set a “lock”
that doesn’t allow them to respond to primaries suggesting values from older views. en, before deciding on a value,
every nonfaulty party requires a proof that many parties are locked on the current view. is ensures that if some value
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is decided upon, there will be a large number of nonfaulty parties that won’t be willing to receive messages from older
views, and thus this will remain the only viable value in the system.
A natural issue that can arise using this mechanism is the system geing stuck because parties are locked and aren’t
willing to advance the protocol. In order to avoid this issue, before seing a lock, each nonfaulty party receives a “key”
message from this view. en, when a new primary is chosen, it receives the highest keys parties have, and sends the
highest one it receives. is system is used in such a way that if some nonfaulty party is locked, it is guaranteed that
some nonfaulty party will have a large enough key to open it. is technique might pose a threat to the security of the
system, because a faulty primary could always say it received a very high key, or just suggest the wrong value. In order
to avoid this, each key also has a value associated with it (which should equal the value parties received if they are
locked), and then the primary receives a transferable proof that the key is valid. en, before accepting a key from a
primary, every nonfaulty party checks the proof, and only then accepts the message.
is proof can be implemented using cryptographic signature primitives, like in HotStu’s solution. e natural
way to implement such a proof in an information theoretic seing is using techniques like Bracha Broadcast [3] in
order to prove that the key received by the primary will also be accepted by the other parties. However, using such
techniques naively requires an unbounded amount of space because of the need to maintain information about which
messages were sent in the distant past. Our solution instead “implements” a one-hop transferable proof using another
round of communication. If before moving to the next round, a nonfaulty party hears from n − f parties, then it knows
it heard from at least f + 1 nonfaulty parties. is means that once the system becomes synchronous, every party will
hear from those f + 1 parties and know that at least one of them is nonfaulty. We use this type of “one-hop transferable
proof” twice so we have 3 keys instead of one, each proving that the next key (or lock) is correct, and that this fact can
be proven to other parties, thereby ensuring liveness.
Similarly to PBFT protocol in the Castro’s thesis [9], instead of just storing the last seen key and value for key1
and key2, we store both the last key and its value, and the last view in which an earlier, dierent value, key was seen.
As stated above, if a decision has been reached on the value val , in every higher view, no other value val ′ will have
enough echo message sent about it for parties to set the value of their key1 to val ′. erefore, in order to prove that
a lock from a given view is no longer relevant and could be opened, it is enough to show that at least one nonfaulty
party has set the value of its key1 to another value in a later view. In order to send just a constant number of words, we
use a technique similar to the one suggested in Castro’s esis [9]: send just the last two times that the value of key1
was updated. If the nal update to key1 happened aer a lock was set, and its value is dierent than the lock’s value,
then the lock is safe to open. Otherwise, if the older of the two updates was aer the lock’s view then at least in one of
those times it was updated to a value other than the lock’s value, and thus the lock is also safe to open. Using this idea,
parties can also prove to a primary that a key3 suggestion is safe. In this case, the parties either show a later view in
which the same value was set for key2, or two later views in which the value of key2 was updated. is proof shows
that any previous lock either has the same value as key3, or can be opened safely regardless of its value.
ankfully, the use of three key rounds makes these proofs transferable in addition to being suciently safe. If some
nonfaulty primary decides to propose a value val from the view v , it rst waits to receive f + 1 such proofs regarding
key2, one of which is from a nonfaulty i . Recall that it is either the case that the value of i’s current key2 is val , or that
i updated the value of its key2 twice aer the view v . Before seing the value of its key2 eld, i waits to receive n − f
messages with that same value. erefore, when a nonfaulty primary proposes a value val from the view v , it knows
that at least f + 1 nonfaulty parties have either set the value of their key1 to be val in some later view, or updated the
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value of key1 twice since the view v . Aer GST, this guarantees that every nonfaulty party that is locked on a value
val ′ other than val from an older view will hear from those f + 1 parties and see that it can open its lock.
1.3 Protocol Overview
Much like HotStu, each view of IT-HS consists of a constant number of rounds. Each party waits to receive n− f round
i messages before it sends a round i + 1 message (in some rounds there are additional checks). Much like PBFT, each
round involves an all-to-all message sending format. IT-HS uses the view change, propose, key, lock approach of HotStu.
roughout the protocol, parties may set a lock for a given view and value. is lock indicates that any proposal for a
dierent view, value pair should not be accepted without ample proof that another value reached advanced stages in a
later view. In order to provide that proof, the parties send a proo f message that helps convince parties with locks to
accept messages about a dierent value if appropriate.
e rounds of IT-HS for a given view can be partitioned into 4 parts:
(1) View Change: parties rst send a request message, indicating that they started the view. Once parties hear the
request message sent by the primary, they respond with their current suggestion for a value to propose, as
well as the view in which this suggestion originated, and additional data which will help validate all nonfaulty
parties’ suggestions (proofs). Aer receiving those suggestions, the primary checks whether each suggestion is
valid, and once it sees n − f valid suggestions, it sends a propose message for the one that originated in the
most recent view.
(2) Propose message round: this is where a party checks the propose relative to its lock. Each party checks that
it’s locked on the same value as the one proposed, or convinced to override it’s lock by f + 1 proof messages,
and responds by sending an echo message.
(3) Key message rounds: this is where a key is created that can be later used to unlock parties. Aer receiving
n − f echo messages with the same value, parties send a key1 message with that value. Aer receiving n − f
key1 messages with the same value they send a key2 message. Aer receiving n − f key2 messages with the
same value they send a key3 message. We use these three rounds in order to obtain transferable information
theoretic signatures on the key message.
(4) Lock and commit rounds: Aer receiving n − f key3 messages with the same value they lock on it and send a
lock message. Aer receiving n − f lock messages with the same value they commit and send a done message.
Before sending a key1 message, the local key1, key1 val and prev key1 elds are updated. ese elds contain the
last view in which a key1 message was sent, its value, and the last view a key1 message was sent with a dierent value.
Similar updates take place for the other key elds and the lock elds. e echo, lock and various key messages are
tagged with the current view, while the done message is a protocol-wide message and isn’t related to a specic view.
Similarly to the mechanism in Bracha Broadcast [3], aer receiving f + 1 done messages, the message is echoed, and
aer receiving n − f messages it is accepted and the parties decide and terminate. If a party sees that this view takes
more than the expected time, it sends an abort message for the view. e same f + 1 threshold for echoing the abort
message and n − f threshold for moving to the next view are implemented in order to achieve the same properties. In
order to avoid buering request and abort messages, only the messages with the highest view v are actually stored and
are understood as a request or abort message for any view up to v .
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Algorithm 1 IT-HS
Code for party i with input xi :
1: lock ← 0, lock val ← xi
2: key3← 0, key3 val ← xi
3: key2← 0,key2 val ← xi ,prev key2← −1
4: key1← 0,key1 val ← xi ,prev key1← −1
5: view ← 0
6: ∀j ∈ [n] hiдhest request [j] ← 0
7: continually run check proдress() in the background
8: while true do . memory from last process messaдes and view chanдe calls is freed
9: cur view ← view
10: as long as cur view = view , run
11: at time cur time() + 11∆ do
12: send an 〈abort ,view〉 message to all parties
13: ignore messages from other views, other than abort , done and request messages
14: primary ← (view mod n) + 1
15: continually run process messaдes(view) in the background
16: view chanдe(view,primary)
2 BYZANTINE AGREEMENT IN PARTIAL SYNCHRONY
is work deals with the task of Byzantine Agreement in a partially synchronous system. In this model, there exist n
parties who have local clocks and authenticated point-to-point channels to every other party. e system starts o fully
asynchronous: the clocks are not synchronized, and every message can be delayed any nite amount of time before
reaching its recipient. At some point in time, the system becomes fully synchronous: the clocks become synchronized,
and every message (including the ones previously sent) arrives in ∆ time at most, for some commonly known ∆. It
is important to note that even though it is guaranteed that the system eventually becomes synchronous, the parties
do not know when it is going to happen, or even if it has already happened. e point in time in which the system
becomes synchronous is called the Global Stabilization Time, or GST in short. In the seing of a Byzantine adversary,
the adversary can control up to f parties, making them arbitrarily deviate from the protocol. In general, throughout
this work assume that f < n3 .
Denition 2.1. A Byzantine Agreement protocol in partial synchrony has the following properties:
• Termination. If all nonfaulty parties participate in the protocol, they all eventually decide on a value and
terminate.
• Correctness. If two nonfaulty parties decide on values val ,val ′, then val = val ′.
• Validity. If all parties are nonfaulty and they all have the same input val , then every nonfaulty party that
decides on a value does so with the value val .
We note that if we assume the parties have access to an external validity function, as described in [8], this protocol
can be easily adjusted to have external validity. In this seing, the external validity function denes which values are
“valid”, and all nonfaulty parties are required to output a valid value. e only adjustment needed is for parties to also
check if a value is valid before sending an echo message.
e main goal of this section is to show that Algorithm 1 is a Byzantine Agreement protocol in partial synchrony
resilient to f < n3 Byzantine parties. For ease of discussion, a party is said to perform an action “in view v” if when it
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Algorithm 2 view change(view,primary)
Code for party i:
1: send 〈request ,view〉 to all parties j ∈ [n]
2: upon hiдhet request [primary] = view , do
3: send 〈suддest ,key3,key3 val ,key2,key2 val ,prev key2,view〉 to primary
4: send all upon join(〈proo f ,key1,key1 val ,prev key1,view〉)
5: if primary = i then
6: suддestions ← ∅
7: key2 proo f s ← ∅
8: upon receiving the rst 〈suддest ,k3,v3,k2,v2,pk2,view〉 message from j, do
9: if pk2 < k2 < view then
10: add (k2,v2,pk2) to key2 proo f s
11: if k3 = 0 then
12: add (k3,v3) to suддestions
13: else if k3 < view then
14: upon accept key (k3,v3,key2 proo f s) = true , do
15: add (k3,v3) to suддestions
16: wait until |suддestions | ≥ n − f , then do
17: let (k,v) ∈ suддestions be some tuple such that ∀ (k ′,v ′) ∈ suддestions k ′ ≤ k
18: send all upon join(〈propose,k,v,view〉)
Algorithm 3 accept key(key,value,proofs)
1: supportinд← 0
2: for all (k,v,pk) ∈ proo f s do
3: if key ≤ pk then
4: supportinд← supportinд + 1
5: else if key ≤ k ∧value = v then
6: supportinд← supportinд + 1
7: if supportinд ≥ f + 1 then
8: return true
9: else
10: return f alse
Algorithm 4 send all upon join(message)
Code for party i:
1: for all parties j ∈ [n] do
2: upon hiдhest request [j] = view , do
3: send messaдe to party j
performed the action its local view variable equaled v . In addition, we dene the notion of messages “supporting” a key
or opening a lock:
Denition 2.2. A suддest message is said to support a key3 and key3 val pair, if its key2, key2 val , and prev key2
elds are ones for which at least one of the conditions in Algorithm 3 is true.
A proo f message is said to support opening a lock and lock val pair if its key1, key1 val , and prev key1 elds are
ones for which at least one of the conditions in Algorithm 7 is true.
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Algorithm 5 check progress()
Code for party i:
1: ∀j ∈ [n] hiдhest abort [j] ← 0
2: upon receiving a 〈request ,v〉 message from party j, do
3: if hiдhest request [j] < v then
4: hiдhest request[j] ← v
5: upon receiving a 〈done,val〉 message from f + 1 parties with the same val , do
6: if no done message has been previously sent then
7: send 〈done,val〉 to every party j ∈ [n]
8: upon receiving a 〈done,val〉 message from n − f parties with the same val , do
9: decide val and terminate
10: upon receiving an 〈abort ,v〉 message from party j, do
11: if hiдhest abort [j] < v then
12: hiдhest abort [j] ← v
13: let u be the f + 1’th largest value in hiдhest abort
14: if u > hiдhest abort [i] then
15: send 〈abort ,u〉 to every party j ∈ [n]
16: hiдhest abort [i] ← u
17: let w be the n − f ’th largest value in hiдhest abort
18: if w ≥ view then
19: view ← w + 1
Before proving that Algorithm 1 is a Byzantine Agreement protocol in partial synchrony, we prove several lemmas.
e lemmas can be classied into two types: safety lemmas and liveness lemmas. e safety lemmas show that if a
nonfaulty party decides on some value, no nonfaulty party decides on a dierent value. is is achieved by the locking
mechanism. Roughly speaking, if some nonfaulty party decides on some value, there exist f + 1 nonfaulty parties that
are locked on that value and will stop any other value from progressing past the propose message. e liveness lemmas
show two crucial properties for liveness. First of all, if some nonfaulty party sets key3 to be some value, then there are
f + 1 parties that will support that key. is means that if a nonfaulty party hears key suggestions from all nonfaulty
parties, it accepts them and picks some key. Secondly, if some nonfaulty primary picks a key to propose, the suддest
messages it receives guarantee that any nonfaulty party will receive enough supporting proo f messages. is means
that all nonfaulty parties accept the primary’s proposal, even if they are locked on some other value. In the following
lemmas assume that the number of faulty parties is f < n3 .
2.1 Safety Lemmas
e following lemma and corollary show that a primary cannot equivocate in a given view. More precisely, in a given
view all nonfaulty parties send messages that report the same value, other than echo messages which might have more
than one value.
Lemma 2.3. If two nonfaulty parties send the messages 〈key1,val ,v〉 and 〈key1,val ′,v〉, then val = val ′.
Proof. Observe two nonfaulty parties i and j that sent the messages 〈key1,val ,v〉 and 〈key1,val ′,v〉 respectively.
Before doing so, i received the message 〈echo,val ,view〉 from n − f parties, f + 1 of which are nonfaulty. Let the set of
those nonfaulty parties be I . Similarly, j received the message 〈echo,val ′,view〉 from n − f parties. Since there are
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Algorithm 6 process messages(view)
Code for party i:
1: proo f s ← ∅
2: upon receiving the rst 〈proo f ,k1,v1,pk1,view〉 message from j, do
3: if view > k1 > pk1 then
4: add (k1,v1,pk1) to proo f s
5: upon receiving the rst 〈propose,key,val ,view〉 message from primary, do
6: if lock = 0 ∨val = lock val then
7: send all upon join(〈echo,val ,view〉)
8: else if view > key ≥ lock then
9: upon open lock (key,val ,proo f s) = true , do
10: send all upon join(〈echo,val ,view〉)
11: upon receiving an 〈echo,val ,view〉 message from n − f parties with the same val , do
12: send all upon join(〈key1,val ,view〉)
13: if key1 val , val then
14: prev key1← key1,key1 val ← val
15: key1← view
16: upon receiving a 〈key1,val ,view〉 message from n − f parties with the same val , do
17: send all upon join(〈key2,val ,view〉)
18: if key2 val , val then
19: prev key2← key2,key2 val ← val
20: key2← view
21: upon receiving a 〈key2,val ,view〉 message from n − f parties with the same val , do
22: send all upon join(〈key3,val ,view〉)
23: key3← view,key3 val ← val
24: upon receiving a 〈key3,val ,view〉 message from n − f parties with the same val , do
25: send all upon join(〈lock,val ,view〉) to every party j ∈ [n]
26: lock ← view, lock val ← val
27: upon receiving a 〈lock,val ,view〉 message from n − f parties with the same val , do
28: if no done message has been previously sent then
29: send 〈done,val〉 to every party j ∈ [n]
Algorithm 7 open lock(key,val,view)
Code for party i:
1: supportinд← 0
2: for all (k,v,pk) ∈ proo f s do
3: if lock ≤ pk then
4: supportinд← supportinд + 1
5: else if lock ≤ k ∧v , lock val then
6: supportinд← supportinд + 1
7: if supportinд ≥ f + 1 then
8: return true
9: else
10: return f alse
only n parties, j must have received the message from at least one party k ∈ I . Party k is nonfaulty, so it sends the same
key1 message to all parties. erefore, val = val ′. 
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Corollary 2.4. If two nonfaulty parties i and j send a 〈taд,val ,v〉 and 〈taд′,val ′,v〉 message such that taд, taд′ ∈
{key1,key2,key3, lock} then val = val ′.
Proof. If some nonfaulty party sent a 〈key1,val ,v〉 message, from Lemma 2.3 all nonfaulty parties that send a
〈key1,val ′,v〉 message do so with val = val ′. Now observe some nonfaulty party that sends a 〈key2,val ′,v〉 message.
It rst received a 〈key1,val ′,v〉 from n − f parties, f + 1 of which are nonfaulty. Using the previous observation,
val ′ = val . Note that this also means that if two nonfaulty parties send 〈key2,val ,v〉 and 〈key2,val ′,v〉 messages,
then val = val ′. Using similar logic, the same can be said for key3 and lock messages. 
e following lemma and corollary now show that all done messages that nonfaulty parties send have the same
value. ere are two ways nonfaulty party might send a done message: in the end of a view, or aer receiving enough
done messages from other parties. In the rst view a nonfaulty party sends a done message in line 29, no nonfaulty
party sends a done message with another value because of the previous non-equivocation claims. en, once such a
done message is sent, there are f + 1 nonfaulty parties that are locked on that value, and won’t allow any other value to
be proposed by a primary. Since all nonfaulty parties send done messages with the same value at the end of views, they
never enough done messages with another value for them to echo that done message.
Lemma 2.5. If two nonfaulty parties send the messages 〈done,val〉 and 〈done,val ′〉 in line 29, then val = val ′.
Proof. Let v∗ be the rst view in which some nonfaulty party sends a done message in line 29. We will now prove
by induction that:
• for every v ≥ v∗, no nonfaulty party sends a 〈key1,val ′,v〉 message with val ′ , val ,
• from that point on there exist f + 1 nonfaulty parties with lock ≥ v∗, lock val = val ,
• no nonfaulty party has prev key1 ≥ v∗,
• and for every nonfaulty party that has key1 ≥ v∗, key1 val = val .
First, observe the view v∗. Some nonfaulty party sent the message 〈done,val〉 in line 29 during view v , and thus
it received a 〈lock,val ,v∗〉 message from n − f parties. Since n − 2f ≥ f + 1, f + 1 of those parties are nonfaulty.
Aer sending such a message, every one of those nonfaulty parties set lock = v∗, lock val = val , which proves the
second condition holds. From Corollary 2.4, every nonfaulty party that sends a 〈key1,val ′,v∗〉 message does so with
val = val ′. Clearly before view v∗, all nonfaulty parties have prev key1 < key1 < v∗. is means that for every
nonfaulty party that doesn’t update its key1 or prev key1 elds in view v∗, the claim holds in the end of view v∗. Now
observe some nonfaulty party that updates its key1 eld in view v∗. If in the beginning of the view key1 val = val ,
the party only updates key1 = v∗, and thus the claim holds. Otherwise, key val , val , and the party rst updates
prev key1 = key1 < v∗ and then updates key1 = v∗,key val = val . e claim holds in this case as well.
Now, assume the claim holds for every v ′ such that v > v ′ ≥ v∗. Let I be a set of f + 1 nonfaulty parties for whom
lock ≥ v∗, lock val = val . Observe some nonfaulty party i that sends a 〈key1,val ′,v〉 message. It must have rst
received an 〈echo,val ′,v〉 message from n− f parties. Since |I | = f + 1, one of those parties is in the set I . Let that party
be j . Party j only sends such a message if either val = val ′ or if it receives proo f messages that support opening its lock
in view v from f + 1 parties, one of which is nonfaulty. However, for every nonfaulty party, prev key1 < v∗ ≤ lock , so
the rst condition of Algorithm 7 doesn’t hold. If key1 ≥ lock ≥ v∗ then key1 val = val = lock val , which means that
the second condition of Algorithm 7 doesn’t hold. erefore, it must be the case that val ′ = val . In other words, if
some nonfaulty party sends a 〈key,val ′,v〉, val ′ = val , and thus the rst part of the induction claim holds.
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If some nonfaulty party in I updates its lock value in view v , then it rst received 〈lock,val ′,v〉 messages from n − f
parties, f + 1 of which are nonfaulty. From Corollary 2.4, if some nonfaulty party sends a lock message in view v it
does so with val ′ = val . erefore, if some nonfaulty party in I updates its lock value in view v , it sets lock = v > v∗
and lock value = val . In other words, I remains a set of f + 1 nonfaulty parties with lock ≥ v∗, lock val = val . Now
observe some nonfaulty party i . If i doesn’t update its key1 eld, then it doesn’t update its prev key1 eld either. In
that case, the nal two conditions of the induction hold. If i updates its key1 eld, it must be the case that i received
〈key1,val ,v〉 messages from n − f parties. If i already had key1 val = val , then it only updates key1 = v > v∗, and
prev key1 < v∗ remains true. If i had key1 val , val , then from the induction hypothesis it must be the case that
key1 < v∗. In that case, i updates prev key1 = key1 < v∗ and then key1 = v > v∗,key val = val . In both of those
scenarios the claim continues to hold, completing the induction.
Finally, if some nonfaulty party sends a 〈done,val ′〉 message in view v ≥ v∗ in line 29, then it rst received a
〈lock,val ′,v〉 message from n − f parties, f + 1 of which are nonfaulty. As shown above, in round v at least n − f
parties sent some 〈key1,val ′′,v〉 message, f + 1 of which are nonfaulty as well. Combining the previous observations
and Corollary 2.4, val ′ = val ′′ = val , completing our proof. 
Corollary 2.6. If two nonfaulty parties send the messages 〈done,val〉 and 〈done,val ′〉, then val = val ′.
Proof. Assume by way of contradiction that there exist two values val , val ′ such that two nonfaulty parties sent
the messages 〈done,val〉 and 〈done,val ′〉. Let i be the rst nonfaulty party that sent a 〈done,val〉 message and j be
the rst nonfaulty party that sent a 〈done,val ′〉 message. If i sent the message in line 7 it must have rst received the
message 〈done,val〉 from f + 1 parties, one of which is nonfaulty. By assumption, i is the rst nonfaulty party that
sends such a message, reaching a contradiction. Similarly j couldn’t have sent the message in line 7. is means that
both of them sent their respective messages in line 29, and thus from Lemma 2.5, val = val ′. 
2.2 Liveness Lemmas
e rst two lemmas show that no nonfaulty party gets “stuck” in a view. If some nonfaulty party terminates, then
every nonfaulty party eventually terminates as well. In addition, aer GST, all nonfaulty parties start participating in
consecutive views until terminating.
Lemma 2.7. Observe some nonfaulty party i that terminates. All nonfaulty parties terminate no later than 2∆ time aer
both GST occurs, and i terminates.
Proof. If i terminates, then it received 〈done,val〉 messages with the same value val from n − f parties, f + 1 of
which are nonfaulty. Every one of those nonfaulty parties sends the message to all nonfaulty parties. Aer GST, all
parties receive those messages in ∆ time or less. If when a nonfaulty party receives those messages it has already sent a
〈done,val ′〉 message, from Corollary 2.6 it did so with val ′ = val . Otherwise, once it receives those messages it sends a
〈done,val〉 message in line 7. In other words, all nonfaulty parties eventually send a 〈done,val〉 message. All nonfaulty
parties then receive those messages in ∆ more time. Aer receiving those messages, every nonfaulty party that hasn’t
terminated yet does so. In total, all of those messages arrive in no more than 2∆ time, and then all nonfaulty parties
terminate. 
Lemma 2.8. Letv be the highest view that some nonfaulty party is in at GST. For every view v ′ > v , all nonfaulty parties
either start view v ′, or terminate in some earlier view.
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Furthermore, if some nonfaulty party starts view v ′ aer GST, all nonfaulty parties either terminate or start view v ′ no
later than 2∆ time aerwards.
Proof. If some nonfaulty party terminated before GST, from Lemma 2.7 all nonfaulty parties terminate 2∆ time
aer GST. At GST, no nonfaulty party is in any view greater than v . is means that no nonfaulty party sends an
〈abort ,v ′〉 message for any v ′ > v in line 12 before GST. erefore, at that time, for every nonfaulty party, the f + 1’th
largest value in hiдhest abort is no greater than v , and thus no nonfaulty party sends an 〈abort ,v ′〉 message for any
v ′ > v in line 15 either. Since i started view v , it found that the n − f ’th largest value in hiдhest abort is v − 1. In order
for that to happen, i must have received
〈
abort ,vj
〉
messages from n − f parties j such that vj ≥ v − 1, and update
hiдhest abort accordingly. Out of those n − f parties, at least f + 1 are nonfaulty so they sent the same message to
all parties and the nonfaulty parties receive that message in ∆ time. Every nonfaulty party that receives those f + 1
messages updates hiдhest abort accordingly and sees that the f + 1’th largest value in hiдhest abort is at least v − 1
and thus sends an 〈abort ,u〉 message for some u ≥ v − 1 to all parties. Every nonfaulty party receives those messages
in ∆ time, updates hiдhest abort accordingly and nds that the n − f ’th largest value in hiдhest abort is at least v − 1.
Aerwards, they all compute the n − f ’th largest value in hiдhest abort , w ≥ v − 1, and start view w + 1. Note that as
discussed above, none of the messages those nonfaulty parties send is sent in a view greater than v , so all nonfaulty
parties either start view v or view v + 1 in 2∆ time. Using similar arguments, if some nonfaulty party starts view v ′
aer GST, all nonfaulty parties start view v ′ as well in no more than 2∆ time. Finally, aer 11∆ time in each view, every
nonfaulty party that hasn’t terminated sends an abort message, all nonfaulty parties receive that message in ∆ time and
start the next view until some nonfaulty party terminates. Crucially, no nonfaulty node sends an 〈abort ,v ′〉 message in
line 12 before 11∆ time has passed, so using similar arguments every nonfaulty hears all of the relevant abort messages
and starts view v ′ before starting any later views. 
Eventually, all nonfaulty parties participate in some view with a nonfaulty primary, if they haven’t terminated
previously. e next lemmas show that once that happens, all nonfaulty parties terminate. First of all, in order for that
to happen, a primary needs to receive enough suggestions for a key3 that it will accept. e following lemma shows
that every nonfaulty party’s key3 eld has enough support from nonfaulty parties for the primary to accept the key.
Intuitively, since a nonfaulty party set its key3 eld to some value, there exist f + 1 nonfaulty parties that sent a key2
message with that value. e lemma shows that those f + 1 nonfaulty parties have key2, key2 val and prev key2 elds
that continue to support the key.
Lemma 2.9. If some nonfaulty party sets key3 = v , key3 val = val in view v , then there exist f + 1 nonfaulty parties
whose suддest messages in every view v ′ > v support key3 and key3 val .
Proof. We will prove by induction that there exist f + 1 nonfaulty parties for whom in every v ′ > v either
prev key2 ≥ key3, or key2 ≥ key and key2 value = val . Since those are the elds that nonfaulty parties send in
suддest messages, that proves the lemma. First, observe view v . In that view, some nonfaulty party set key3 = v and
key3 val = val . is means that it received a 〈key2,val ,v〉 message from n − f parties, f + 1 of whom are nonfaulty.
In addition to other possible updates, every one of those parties updates key2 = view , and key2 val = val if that isn’t
true already. ose f + 1 parties prove the claim for view v .
Now assume the claim holds for every v ′′ < v ′. Observe party j, which is one of the f + 1 parties described in the
induction claim. If j doesn’t update any of its key2 elds in viewv ′, those conditions continue to hold in the end of view
v ′ and in the beginning of the next view. If j only updates key2 to be v ′, then if prev key2 ≥ key3, it remains that way,
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and if key2 ≥ key3 as well as key2 val = key3 val , aer updating key2 to be v ′ > key2 ≥ key3, it also remains that
way. Otherwise j updates prev key2 = key2 too. Note that key2 > prev key2 at all times. erefore, before updating
prev key2, regardless of which part of the induction claim holds, key2 ≥ key3. Aer updating prev key2 to be key2,
prev key2 ≥ key3, completing the proof. 
e following lemma is used to show that if a nonfaulty primary chose some key, and some nonfaulty party has a
lock, it is either the case that the key’s value equals the lock’s value, or there are enough nonfaulty parties that support
opening the lock. Note that that the conditions of the lemma are nearly identical to the conditions the primary checks
before accepting a proof as supporting some key. is means that before accepting a key, the primary essentially checks
if there is enough support to open any other lock. Similarly to the previous lemma, this lemma shows that if some
nonfaulty party sets key2 to some value, there are f + 1 parties that sent a key1 message with that value. ose f + 1
parties’ key1, key1 val and prev key1 elds then continue to support any lock set previously with another value.
Lemma 2.10. Let lock > 0 be some nonfaulty party’s lock and lock val be its value. If some nonfaulty party either
has prev key2 ≥ lock or key2 ≥ lock and key2 val , lock val , then there exist f + 1 parties whose key1, key1 val and
prev key1 elds support opening the lock.
Proof. Let i be a nonfaulty party such that either prev key2 ≥ lock or key2 ≥ lock and key2 val , lock val . If
key2 ≥ lock > 0 and key2 val , lock val , i received a 〈key1,key1 val ,key2〉 message from n − f parties in view key2.
Out of those n − f parties, at least f + 1 are nonfaulty. On the other hand, if prev key2 ≥ lock > 0, then for some pair
of values val ,val ′ such that val , val ′, i received a 〈key1,val ,prev key2〉 message from f + 1 nonfaulty parties in
view prev key2 and a 〈key1,val ′,key2〉 message from f + 1 nonfaulty parties in view key2 > prev key2 ≥ lock . At
least one of the values val ,val ′ must not equal lock val because val , val ′. In other words, in both cases there exist
f + 1 nonfaulty parties that sent a 〈key1,val ,v〉 in view v such that val , lock val and v ≥ lock . Let I be the set of
those nonfaulty parties.
We now prove by induction that for every v ′ ≥ v , all of the parties in I either have prev key1 ≥ lock or key1 ≥ lock
and key1 val , lock val . First, observe view v . As stated above, in view v all of the parties in I sent a 〈key1,val ,v〉
and thus set key1 = v ≥ lock and key1 val = val , lock val , if it wasn’t already so. Now, assume the claim holds
for all views v ′′ < v ′. Note that the values of key1 and prev key1 only grow throughout the run. is means that if
prev key1 ≥ lock in the beginning of viewv ′, this will also be true at the end of viewv ′. On the other hand, if that is not
the case, then in the beginning of viewv ′, key1 ≥ lock and key1 val , lock val . If the value of key1 val isn’t updated in
view v ′, then key1 can only grow and thus the claim continues to hold. On the other, if the value of key1 val is updated
in viewv ′, then for someval ′ , val the following updates take place: key1← v ′,key1 val ← val ′,prev key1← key1.
By assumption, in the beginning of view v ′, key1 ≥ lock , and thus aer the update prev key1 ≥ lock , completing the
proof. 
is nal lemma ties the two previous lemmas together. Once a nonfaulty party is chosen as primary aer GST, the
primary receives enough keys, and each one of them has enough support to be accepted. en, aer the key is sent,
every nonfaulty party either has a lock with the same value, or there is enough support to open its lock. From this
point on, the view progresses easily and all nonfaulty parties terminate.
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Lemma 2.11. Let v be the rst view with a nonfaulty primary that starts aer GST1. All nonfaulty parties decide on a
value and terminate in view v , if they haven’t done so earlier.
Furthermore, if all messages between nonfaulty parties are actually delayed only δ time until being received, they decide
on a value and terminate in O (δ ) time.
Proof. If some nonfaulty party terminated previously, from Lemma 2.7, all nonfaulty parties terminate in 2∆ time
aer GST. Now assume no nonfaulty party previously terminated. Since v starts only aer GST, it is larger than the
largest view some nonfaulty party is in at GST. In that case, from Lemma 2.8 every nonfaulty party eventually starts
view v . Furthermore, from the second part of Lemma 2.8 they all start view v no later than 2∆ time aer the rst
nonfaulty party that starts it.
In the beginning of viewv all nonfaulty parties compute a nonfaulty primary i for viewv . Aerwards, the parties call
view chanдe (v, i) and send a 〈request ,v〉 message to all nonfaulty parties. As stated above, no nonfaulty party started
any view v ′ > v yet, so no nonfaulty party received a 〈request ,v ′〉 message for any v ′ > v from any other nonfaulty
party. Aer ∆ time, the request message sent by every nonfaulty party j is received by all nonfaulty parties, and then
they update hiдhest request [j] = v . At that point, in every send all upon join call, every nonfaulty party sends every
other nonfaulty party the relevant message. Also note that no nonfaulty party sends any of the messages from its
current view before receiving a request message. Since the request messages are sent only aer starting the view, no
relevant message sent by a nonfaulty party is discarded in this view. Aer receiving the primary’s request message,
all nonfaulty parties send i a suддest message consisting of their key3 and key3 val elds, as well as key2, key2 val
and prev key2 elds. In addition, they all send a proo f message message to all parties. Observe one suддest message
sent by party j . e primary i receives that message in ∆ time at most. If key3 = 0, i adds (key,key val) to suддestions .
Note that whenever a nonfaulty party updates key2 and prev key2 it sets prev key2 < key2. is means that i adds
(key2,key2 val ,prev key2) to key2 proo f s . From Lemma 2.9, every nonfaulty party’s key3, key3 val pair has f + 1
supporting suддest messages from nonfaulty parties, which means that i eventually adds the tuple (key3,key3 val) to
suддestions for each message received from a nonfaulty party. en, i sees that |suддestions | ≥ n − f , picks some tuple
(key,val) ∈ suддestions with a maximal key, and sends the message 〈propose,key,val ,v〉 to all parties.
All nonfaulty parties receive that propose message from the primary in ∆ more time, as well as the proo f message
sent by all nonfaulty parties. Now, observe some locked party l . If l sees that lock = 0 or val = lock val , it sends an
〈echo,val ,v〉 message to all nonfaulty parties. If that is not the case, l has set lock = v ′ > 0 in some view v ′ < v , and
lock val = val ′ for some val ′ , val . Before seing its lock in view v ′, l must have received a 〈key3,val ′,v ′〉 from
n − f parties. Out of those parties, f + 1 are nonfaulty, and they set they key3 eld to be v ′. Note that nonfaulty parties
only increase their key3 eld throughout the protocol. is means that out of the n − f suggestions received by i , at
least one was for a key3 that is greater than v ′. Since i takes the tuple with the maximal key, we know that key ≥ v ′.
Note that since (key,val) ∈ suддestions , if key , 0, i received f + 1 suддest messages that support the pair of values.
At least one of those messages was sent by a nonfaulty party j. Observe j’s message supporting the pair key, val . e
message contains j’s key2, key2 val and prev key2 elds. e message supports the pair key and val and thus it is
either the case that prev key2 ≥ key ≥ lock or that key2 ≥ lock and key2 val = val , lock val . From Lemma 2.10,
there are f + 1 parties whose key1, key1 val and prev key1 elds support opening l ’s lock, and thus they send proo f
messages that support opening the lock. Party l receives those messages and then sends an 〈echo,val ,v〉 message as
well.
1More precisely, by ”starting aer GST”, we mean that the rst time some nonfaulty party has view ≥ v is aer GST.
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All nonfaulty parties receive the echo message from n − f parties ∆ time later and then send a 〈key1,val ,v〉 message
to all parties. Similarly, aer ∆ more time all nonfaulty parties receive a 〈key1,val ,v〉 message from all nonfaulty
parties and send 〈key2,val ,v〉 message. e same argument can be made for sending a key3 message, a lock message,
and a done message, each taking ∆ more time. Finally, aer ∆ more time, all parties receive the done messages. It is
important to note that if some nonfaulty party has already sent a 〈done,val ′,v ′〉 message in view v ′ < v , then from
Corollary 2.6, it does so with val = val ′. Aer receiving those done messages from n − f parties, all nonfaulty parties
decide on a value and terminate.
e overall time for all of the steps is 2∆ + 9 · ∆ = 11∆. During that time, no nonfaulty party sends an 〈abort ,v〉
message, so all nonfaulty parties reach the point in which they decide on val without having to change view. If all
of those messages are actually delivered in δ time or less, then the previous calculations can be done with δ instead,
nding that all nonfaulty decide on a value in 11δ = O (δ ) time instead. 
2.3 Main Theorem
Using the previous lemmas, it is now possible to prove the main theorem:
Theorem 2.12. Algorithm 1 is a Byzantine Agreement protocol in partial synchrony resilient to f < n3 Byzantine
parties.
Proof. We prove each property individually.
Correctness. Observe two nonfaulty parties i, j that decide on the values val ,val ′ respectively. Party i rst received
a 〈done,val〉 message from n − f parties, and j received a 〈done,val ′〉 message from n − f parties. Since n − f > f , i
and j receive at least one of their respective messages from some nonfaulty party. From Corollary 2.6, all nonfaulty
parties that send a done message do so with the same value. erefore, val = val ′.
Validity. Assume all parties are nonfaulty and they have the same input val . We will prove by induction that for
every view v , every nonfaulty party has key3 val = val . Furthermore, if some nonfaulty party sends a 〈key1,val ′,v〉
message, then val ′ = val . First, all parties set key3 val to be val in the beginning of the protocol. Assume the claim
holds for every v ′ < v . In the beginning of view v , the primary calls the view chanдe protocol. Before completing
view chanдe , the primary receives suддest messages from n − f parties with their key3 val eld. Since all parties
are nonfaulty, they all send the key3 val they have at that point, and from the induction hypothesis key3 val = val .
is means that if the primary completes the view chanдe protocol, it sees that for every (key,key val) ∈ suддestions ,
key val = val and thus if the primary sends a propose message it sends the message 〈propose,val ,key,v〉 to all parties.
Now, every nonfaulty party that sends a key1 message sends the message 〈key1,val ,v〉. From Corollary 2.4, every
nonfaulty party that sends a 〈key3,val ′,v〉 message, does so with val ′ = val . If a nonfaulty party updates key3 val
to a new value val ′, it also sends a 〈key3,val ′,v〉 message. However, as shown above the only value sent in such a
message is val so no nonfaulty party updates its key3 val eld to any other value. Using Corollary 2.4, every nonfaulty
party that sends a lock message does so with the value val . is means that any party that sends a done message in
line 29, does so with the value val . Clearly any party that sends a done message in line 7 does so with the value val as
well, because it never receives done messages with any other value. Finally, this means that every nonfaulty party that
decides on a value decides on val .
Termination. Observe the system aer GST, and let v be the highest view that some nonfaulty party is in at that
time. From Lemma 2.8, all nonfaulty parties either terminate or participate in every viewv ′ > v . Since the primaries are
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chosen in a round-robin fashion, aer no more than f + 1 views, some nonfaulty party starts a view with a nonfaulty
primary. From Lemma 2.11, all nonfaulty parties either terminate in that view or earlier. 
2.4 Complexity Measures
e main complexity measures of interest are round complexity, word complexity, and space complexity.
Word complexity. In IT-HS in every round, every party sends at most O(1) words to every other party. We assume
that a word is large enough to contain any counter or identier. is implies that just O(n2) words are sent in each
round.
Round complexity. As IT-HS is a primary-backup view-based protocol (like Paxos and PBFT), there are no bounds
on the number of rounds while the system is still asynchronous. erefore, we use the standard measure of counting
the number of rounds and number of words sent aer GST. Furthermore, in order to be useful in the task of agreeing on
many values, a desirable property is optimistic responsiveness: when the primary is nonfaulty and the network delay is
low, all nonfaulty parties complete the protocol at network speed. is desire is captured in the next denition:
Denition 2.13 (Optimistic Responsivness). Assume all messages between nonfaulty parties are actually delivered in
δ < ∆ time. e protocol is said to be optimistically responsive if all nonfaulty parties complete the protocol in O (δ )
time aer a nonfaulty primary is chosen aer GST.
Space complexity. We separate the local space complexity into two types: persistent memory and transient memory.
Persistent memory is never erased (even if the party is rebooted) while transient memory can be erased by a reboot
event. IT-HS requires asymptotically optimal O(1) persistent storage (measured in words) and just O(1) transient
memory per communication channel (so a total of O(n) transient memory).
Aer a reboot, nonfaulty parties can ask other parties to send messages that help recover information needed in
their transient memory. In this seing we assume that all nonfaulty parties that terminate still reply to messages asking
for previously sent information.
Theorem 2.14. During Algorithm 1, each nonfaulty party sends a constant number of words to each other party in each
view and requires O (n) memory overall, out of which O(1) is persistent memory. Furthermore, the protocol is optimistically
responsive.
Proof. First note that each view consists of one message sent from all parties to the primary, one message sent from
the primary to all parties, and a constant number of all-to-all communication rounds. In addition, each message consists
of no more than 7 words. Overall, each party only sends a constant number of messages to every party, each with a
constant number of words. In each view, every nonfaulty party needs to remember which messages were sent to it by
other parties, as well as a constant amount of information about every suддest and proo f message. Since a constant
number of words and messages is sent from each party to every other party, this requires O(n) memory. Note that once
a new view is started, all of the information stored in the previous call to view chanдe and process messaдes is freed.
Other than that, every nonfaulty party allocates two arrays of size n, a constant number of other elds, and needs to
remember the rst done messages received from every other party. is also requires O(n) memory. Overall, the only
elds that need to be stored in persistent memory are the view , lock , lock val , and various key, key val and prev key
elds, as well as the messages it sent in the current view, and the last done , request and abort messages it sent. is is a
constant number of elds, in addition to a constant number of messages. Aer being rebooted, a nonfaulty party i
can ask to receive the last done , request , and abort messages sent by all nonfaulty parties to restore the information it
Manuscript submied to ACM
Information eoretic HotStu 17
lost that doesn’t pertain to any specic view, and any message sent in the current view. In addition, it sends a request
message for its current view. Upon receiving such a message, a nonfaulty party j replies with the last done , request and
abort messages it sent. In addition, if j is in the view that party i asked about, it also re-sends the messages it sent in
the current view. Note that this is essentially the same as i receiving messages late and starting its view aer being
rebooted, and thus all of the properties still hold. e fact that the protocol is optimistically responsive is proven in
Lemma 2.11. 
3 MULTI-SHOT BYZANTINE AGREEMENT AND STATE MACHINE REPLICATION
is section describes taking a Byzantine Agreement protocol and using it to solve two tasks that are natural extensions
of a single shot agreement. Both tasks deal with dierent formulations for the idea of agreeing on many values, instead
of just one.
3.1 State Machine Replication with Stable Leader (a la PBFT)
In the task of State Machine Replication [17], all parties (called replicas) have knowledge of the same state machine.
Each party receives a (possibly innite) series of instructions to perform on the state machine as input. e goal of the
parties is to all perform the same actions on the state machine in the same order. More precisely, the parties are actually
only interested in the state of the state machine, and aren’t required to see all of the intermediary states throughout
computation. In order to avoid trivial solutions, if all parties are nonfaulty and they have the same s’th instruction
as input, then they all execute it as the s’th instruction for the state machine. is task can be achieved utilizing any
Byzantine Agreement protocol, using ideas from the PBFT protocol.
In addition to the inputs, the protocol is parameterized by a window sized α . All parties participate in α instances of
the Byzantine Agreement protocol, each one tagged with the current decision number. Aer each decision, every party
saves a log of their current decision, and updates the state machine according to the decided upon instruction. en,
aer every α2 decisions, each party saves a “checkpoint” with the current state of the state machine, and deletes the
log of the α2 oldest decisions. en, before starting the next
α
2 decisions, every party sends its current checkpoint and
makes sure it receives the same state from n − f parties using technique similar to Bracha broadcast. Furthermore, as
long as no view fails, the primary isn’t replaced. is means that eventually at some point, either there exists a faulty
primary that always acts like a nonfaulty primary, or a nonfaulty primary is chosen and is never replaced. Both sending
the checkpoints and replacing faulty leaders require more implementation details which can be found in [9].
Using these techniques, all parties can decide on O (α) instructions at a time, improving the throughput of the
algorithm. e communication complexity per view remains similar to the communication complexity of the IT-HS
algorithm, but once a nonfaulty primary is reached aer GST, all invocations of the protocol require only one view to
terminate. Alternatively, if a nonfaulty primary is never reached aer GST, a faulty party acts like a nonfaulty primary
indenitely, which yields the same round complexity. Finally, if we assume that a description of the state machine
requires O (S) space, the protocol now requires O(S + α) persistent space in order to store the checkpoints and store the
O(1) state for each slot in the window. In addition, the protocol requires O (α · n + S) transient space in order to store
the information about all active calls to IT-HS, the α decisions in the log, and a description of the current state of the
state machine.
Manuscript submied to ACM
18 Iai Abraham and Gilad Stern
3.2 Multi-Shot Agreement with Pipelining (a la HotStu)
In contrast, we can take the approach of HotStu [18] and solve the task of multi-shot agreement. In this task, party i
has an innite series of inputs x1i ,x
2
i , . . ., and the goal of the parties is to agree on an innite number of values. Each
decision is associated with a slot which is the number s ∈ N of the decision made. Each one of these decisions is
required to have the agreement properties, i.e.: eventually all nonfaulty parties decide on a value for slot s , they all
decide on the same value, and if all parties are nonfaulty and have the same input val for slot s , the decision for the slot
is val .
A naive implementation for this task is to sequentially call separate instances of IT-HS for every slot s ∈ N, each
with the input
(
s,xsi
)
. In order to improve the throughput of the protocol, aer completing an instance of the IT-HS
protocol, the parties can continue with the next view and the next primary in the round-robin. is slight adjustment
ensures that aer GST, n − f out of every n views have a decision made, and if messages between nonfaulty parties
are only delayed δ time, each one of those views requires only O(δ ) time to reach a decision. Slight adjustments need
to be made in that case so that abort messages are sent about views regardless of the slot, so that all parties continue
participating in the same views throughout the protocol. In addition, messages about dierent slots need to be ignored.
In the case of the optimistic assumption that most parties are nonfaulty, a signicantly more ecient alternative
can be gleaned from the HotStu protocol. is alternative uses a technique called pipelining (or chaining). Roughly
speaking, in this technique, all parties start slot s by appending messages, starting on the second round (round, not
view) of slot s − 1. In the case of HT-IS, the protocol can be changed so that suддest messages are sent to all parties, and
then each party starts slot s aer receiving n − f suддest messages in slot s . Note that the exact length of timeouts
needs to be slightly adjusted, and the details can be found in [18]. In slot s , a nonfaulty primary appends its current
proposal to the proposal it heard in slot s − 1. en, before deciding on a value in slot s , parties check that the decision
values in the previous slots agree with the proposal in slot s . If they do, then the parties agree on the value in this
slot as well. In this protocol, each view lasts for 11∆ time, so if at some point a primary sees that a proposal from 11
views ago failed, it appends its proposal to the rst one that it accepted from a previous view. Aer GST, if there are
m + 11 nonfaulty primaries in a row, then the lastm primaries are guaranteed to complete the protocol, and thus addm
decisions in (m + 11)∆ time instead of inm · 11∆ time. is means that in the optimistic case that a vast majority of
parties are nonfaulty, the throughput of this protocol is greatly improved as compared to the naive implementation. In
this protocol the communication complexity per view is still O(n2) messages, but a larger number of words. However,
note that it is not always the case that if a nonfaulty primary is chosen, its proposal is accepted. To obtain bounded
memory requirement one needs to add a checkpointing mechanism, similar to PBFT. As in PBFT, only O(n) transient
space and O(1) persistent space are required per decision in addition to the log of the decisions.
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